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Note: The material contained herein is supplementary to the article named in the title and
published in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics (AJAE)Derivation of the Price Schedule (Stage 2 Equilibrium)
We start by deriving the supply function Qa(Pa;Pb;s;g) representing the quantity of farm
product supplied to trader a under prices Pa and Pb. This enables us to derive the reaction
function P
a(Pb;s;g) (which by symmetry gives us P
b(Pa;s;g)). The intersection of the two
reaction curves represents the equilibrium prices ( ¯ Pa; ¯ Pb). In what follows, we assume that
s 2 [0;1).
The Supply Function
Note ﬁrst that, given our assumption about the reservation utility of farmers, Pa and Pb must
be greater than the assessment s in order to attract suppliers. Further, it is never optimal for,
say, trader a, to offer a price strictly greater than Pb+g, because the entire market supplies
trader a for Pa = g +Pb. Similarly, it is not optimal for trader a to offer a price strictly
lower than Pb g, because then all farmers would prefer to supply to trader b. Therefore,
in deriving Qa(Pa;Pb;s;g), we will take for granted that Pa  s, Pb  s, Pa  g +Pb and
Pa  Pb g.
Second, note that either there exists a farmer who is indifferent between selling to trader
a or trader b, or such as farmer does not exist. Suppose ﬁrst that the indifferent farmer
exists. He must be located at a point Y 2 [0;1] satisfying Pa s gY = Pb s g(1 Y),
that is, Y =
Pa Pb+g
2g . In addition, the proﬁt of this indifferent farmer must be nonnegative
(whichimplies, giventhestructureoftransportationcosts, thattheproﬁtofallotherfarmers
is nonnegative). Hence, we have Pa  s gY  0, or
Pb+Pa g
2  s  0. The conditions
Pa Pb+g
2g 2 [0;1] and
Pb+Pa g
2  s  0 imply that Pa  g +Pb and that Pa  max(Pb g;g +
2s Pb). The supply to trader a is then Qa =Y.
Suppose now that an indifferent farmer does not exist. Because we have ruled out cases
where either trader captures the entire market, the case of no indifferent producer can occur
only when farmers located in the middle of the interval produce only for subsistence use.
This is the case if the farmer located at the market boundary of trader a (i.e., at point
2X = Pa s
g ) would not supply his product to trader b, that is, Pb s g(1  Pa s
g ) < 0, i.e.,
Pa < 2s+g  Pb. The supply to trader a is then Qa = X.






g if s  Pa < g +2s Pb
Pa Pb+g
2g if max(Pb g;g +2s Pb)  Pa  g +Pb
:
Note that g +2s Pb  Pb g , g +2s Pb  s , Pb  s+g. Therefore, if Pb > s+g,
Qa =
Pa Pb+g
2g for all relevant values of Pa.
The Reaction Functions




We will ﬁrst examine the case s  Pb  s+g, and then the case Pb > s+g.
1. s  Pb  s+g
In this case, Qa has two different expressions on the two subintervals s  Pa  g +
2s Pb and g+2s Pb Pa g+Pb. We thus need to solve problem (A-2) separately
on each subinterval and then compare the obtained maximized values, in order to ﬁnd









which yields the following solution:
 if Pb  g + 3
2s  1
2, then Pa = 1+s
2 and Pa =
(1 s)2
4g ;
 if Pb > g + 3
2s  1











which yields the following solution:
 if Pb  max(g + 4
3s  1
3;1 3g), then Pa =
Pb g+1
2 and Pa =
(1 Pb+g)2
8g ;
 if Pb < g + 4
3s  1
3, then Pa = g +2s Pb and Pa =
(1 g 2s+Pb)(g+s Pb)
g ;
 if Pb < 1 3g, then Pa = g +Pb and Pa = 1 g  Pb.
Note that the three conditions above are mutually exclusive.1
We now need to compare the optimized values of Pa on the two subintervals. Sup-
pose ﬁrst that Pb  g + 3
2s  1
2. The maximized value of Pa on [s;g +2s Pb] is
(1 s)2
4g . Since Pb  g + 3
2s  1
2 implies that Pb < g + 4
3s  1
3 for s < 1, the maximized
value of Pa on [g +2s Pb;g +Pb] is
(1 g 2s+Pb)(g+s Pb)




g , so that the optimal response of trader a for this range
of Pb is P
a = 1+s
2 .2
Now suppose that Pb > g + 3
2s  1
2. The maximized value of Pa on [s;g +2s Pb]
is
(1 g 2s+Pb)(g+s Pb)
g , corresponding to price Pa = g +2s Pb. We need to compare
this value to those obtained on the subinterval [g +2s Pb;g +Pb] for each of the
subcases identiﬁed above. The comparisons lead to the following results:






 if Pb < g + 4
3s  1
3, P
a = g +2s Pb;
 if Pb < 1 3g, P
a = g +Pb.
2. Pb > s+g
1To see why Pb < g + 4
3s  1
3 and Pb < 1 3g are mutually exclusive, note that Pb < g + 4
3s  1
3 is equivalent
to g > Pb s+ 1 s
3 , which by Pb  s implies that g >
1 Pb
3 , a condition incompatible with Pb < 1 3g.
2All derivations are available from the authors upon request.
4In this case, the only relevant interval for Pa is [Pb g;g +Pb], where Qa =
Pa Pb+g
2g .
The solution to problem (A-2) in this case is as follows.




 If Pb > g +1, then P
a = Pb  g. However, it is never optimal for trader b to
offer a price Pb greater than 1, because then he would make a negative margin.
Therefore, we can ignore this case.
 if Pb < 1 3g, then P
a = g +Pb.
To summarize, the reaction function P
a(Pb;s;g) has the following form.
 If s  Pb  s+g:





– if Pb > g + 3
2s  1
2, then






 if Pb < g + 4
3s  1
3, P
a = g +2s Pb;
 if Pb < 1 3g, P
a = g +Pb.
 If Pb > s+g:




– if Pb < 1 3g, then P
a = g +Pb.
By the symmetry of traders, P
b(Pa;s;g) has the same form as P
a(Pb;s;g).
The Equilibrium Prices
Equilibriumprices( ¯ Pa; ¯ Pb)areobtainedastheintersectionofthereactioncurvesP
a(Pb;s;g)
and P
b(Pa;s;g). As before, we assume that 0s<1. We also know that s ¯ Pi 1, i=a;b.
The reaction curves have different shapes according to the relative values of g and 1 s.
All possible scenarios are illustrated in ﬁgures A-1 to A-8, where the values g + 4
3s  1
3
and g + 3
2s  1




, respectively, for clarity of
presentation. The results can be summarized as follows.
51. If 0 < g  2
3(1 s), then ¯ Pa = ¯ Pb = ¯ P = 1 g. The market is covered and the in-
different farmer, who receives a positive proﬁt, is located at ¯ Y = 1
2 (ﬁgures A-1, A-2
and A-3).
2. If 2
3(1 s) < g  1 s:
 if 2
3(1 s) < g  5
6(1 s), then ¯ Pa; ¯ Pb 2 [1
3(1+2s);g + 4
3s  1
3] and ¯ Pa+ ¯ Pb =
2s+g (ﬁgure A-4);
 if 5
6(1 s) < g  1 s, then ¯ Pa; ¯ Pb 2 [g + 3
2s  1
2; 1+s
2 ] and ¯ Pa + ¯ Pb = 2s+g
(ﬁgure A-5).
In both subcases, the market is covered and the indifferent farmer, who has zero
proﬁt, is located at ¯ Y =
¯ Pa  ¯ Pb+g
2g =
¯ Pa s
g . For the subcase 2
3(1 s) < g  5
6(1 s),
the indifferent farmer is located inside the segment [1 s
3g ;1  1 s
3g ]. For the subcase
5
6(1 s) < g  1 s, he is located inside the segment [1  1 s
2g ; 1 s
2g ]. Those two
segments are widest for g = 5
6(1 s) where they are both equal to [2
5; 3
5].
3. If g > 1 s, then ¯ Pa = ¯ Pb = ¯ P = 1+s
2 . Only farmers located near the endpoints sell
their production, and the market radius of each trader is ¯ X = 1 s
2g (ﬁgures A-6, A-7
and A-8).
6Investment Regimes When the Initial Market is Monopsonistic
To make the analysis tractable, we make the following assumptions.
Assumption A-1 The transportation improvement technology is described by the function
G(s) = T
eas , where s represents the investment per unit distance, T > 1 represents the pre-
investment level of transportationcosts per unit distance, and a is a positive parameterthat
gives the constant rate at which transportation costs can be decreased with an investment
of $1 per unit distance.
Assumption A-2 The authority spends the assessment revenue to improve transportation
only on the portion of the market area that engages in commercial production in stage 2
equilibrium.
As argued in the article, the functional form in assumption A-1 has several desirable fea-
tures. It implies diminishing returns to per-unit distance investments, involves parameters
that have a direct interpretation, and allows us to simulate a broad variety of improvement
technologies while imposing minimal constraints on the technology.
Assumption A-2 reﬂects an efﬁcient use of assessment funds by the revenue-generating
authority, compared to a scenario where, e.g., the entirety of the production region would
be improved even in cases where the market is only partially covered. It also implies that
when the market is partially covered in stage 2 equilibrium, the minimum transportation
cost achievable with an assessment of s dollars is exactly g = G(s), because the investment
per unit of distance on the portion of the production area that is subject to improvement
is exactly equal to the nominal assessment, given the unit supply assumption.3 Therefore,
besides its intuitive appeal, assumption A-2 ensures that the transportation cost g that can
3If transportation improvements take the form of investments in equipment, such as trucks, assumption A-2
ensures that the authority only purchases the volume of equipment needed to transport the output of farms
selling their product to the external market.
7be achieved with a per-unit assessment of s dollars only depends on s, and not on the
participation rate of farmers in stage 2 equilibrium.4
Figures A-9 to A-12 depict the four possible investment scenarios when starting from
monopsonistic competition, and illustrate the following proposition.
Proposition A-1 For each T > 1, there exists positive numbers a1(T), a2(T) and a3(T)
such that
 ˆ s = 0 if a  a1(T);
 ˆ s > 0 and
ˆ g
1 ˆ s > 1 if a1(T) < a < a2(T);
 ˆ s > 0 and
ˆ g
1 ˆ s = 1 if a2(T)  a < a3(T);
 ˆ s > 0 and
ˆ g
1 ˆ s < 2
3 if a  a3(T).
Proposition A-1 implies that for any given initial transport cost, the potential of pos-
itive assessments to alter the nature of competition between traders directly depends on
the efﬁciency parameter a. For low values of a, producers are better-off not investing in
transportation. For slightly higher values of a, they have an incentive to invest in trans-
portation, although not to the extent where the market is completely covered. For a in the
intermediate range [a2;a3), producers will invest in transportation so that the ﬁnal state
of competition is borderline monopsony/weak duopsony, so the market will be covered.
However, due to the non-monotonicity of the proﬁt schedule, it is never optimal to move
inside the weak duopsony region. In this range of a, although marginal increases in a do
not change the nature of competition between traders, farm proﬁts are still monotonically
increasing in a. Finally, for highly efﬁcient technologies (a  a3), optimal investments in
transportation enable farmers to move to the strict duopsony regime.
4Assumption A-2 is innocuous if the initial transportation cost lies in the weak or strict duopsony range,




























































Figure A-1. Equilibrium prices when 0 < g  1
















































Figure A-2. Equilibrium prices when 1
3(1 s) < g  1
2(1 s). The solution is ¯ Pa = ¯ Pb =
















































Figure A-3. Equilibrium prices when 1
2(1 s) < g  2
3(1 s). The solution is ¯ Pa = ¯ Pb =
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Figure A-4. Equilibrium prices when 2
3(1 s) < g  5
6(1 s). The solution is ¯ Pa; ¯ Pb 2
[1+2s
3 ;g + 4
3s  1














































Figure A-5. Equilibrium prices when 5







































Figure A-6. Equilibrium prices when 1 s < g  4























Figure A-7. Equilibrium prices when 4
3(1 s) < g  3















Figure A-8. Equilibrium prices when g > 3
2(1 s). The solution is ¯ P = 1+s
2 .


















Figure A-9. Optimal assessment with G(s) = 3
e1:5s . The arrow points at the optimum
(ˆ s; ˆ g).

















Figure A-10. Optimal assessment with G(s)= 3
e2:95s . The arrow points at the optimum
(ˆ s; ˆ g).


















Figure A-11. Optimal assessment with G(s) = 3
e4s . The arrow points at the optimum
(ˆ s; ˆ g).


















Figure A-12. Optimal assessment with G(s) = 3
e6s . The arrow points at the optimum
(ˆ s; ˆ g).
20